

SSL/TLS Certificates and The Public-Key Infrastructure (PKI)

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LIMITATIONS OF ASYMMETRIC CRYPTOGRAPHY



The Power of Asymmetric Cryptographic (1/5)

Asymmetric cryptography allows two entities to share a common secret using an unsafe communication channel.



The Power of Asymmetric Cryptographic (2/5)



Secret

←—————→

Insecure Channel



The Power of Asymmetric Cryptographic (3/5)

There are various algorithms for exchanging data securely using asymmetric cryptography:

- Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange
- RSA Key Exchange




The Power of Asymmetric Cryptographic (4/5)

Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange



private: x
public: $g, p, g^x \bmod p$



private: y
public: $g, p, g^y \bmod p$

Secret shared: $g^{(x*y)} \bmod p$



The Power of Asymmetric Cryptographic (5/5)

RSA Key Exchange



private: k

Q: Your public key?



(e, N)



$k^e \bmod N$



private: d
public: (e, N)

Secret shared: k



Mathematically, both **DH** and **RSA** works out.
In the real world, there is a **bigggggg problem** to overcome.



Theory vs Practice



Q: Where is the problem?



Q: Where is the problem?

**The public key is not
authenticated!**



The public key is not authenticated!

More specifically, the **mathematical binding that exists private-key and public-key is not enough** for providing secure connection in case of **Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) attacks**.



DH is not enough in MITM scenarios




private: x
public: $g, p, g^x \bmod p$




private: z
public: $g, p, g^z \bmod p$



private: y
public: $g, p, g^y \bmod p$



Secret shared: $g^{(x*z)} \bmod p$



Secret shared: $g^{(y*z)} \bmod p$



RSA is not enough in MITM scenarios




private: k



private: d_2
public: (e_2, N_2)



private: d_1
public: (e_1, N_1)



To overcome this problem we need a


cryptographic certificate



X.509 CERTIFICATES



To solve our problem we need to **bind a private/public key pair to an entity identifier.**



Binding Mathematics to the real world

Mathematics

Private parameters

D = 77614656301616714363940727332567567525887638349230442635511189887
04659594604713263503897608903165838219379473647953514843671692125
80231655993152129616761344530050725986827108953721558434941732038
43759157305392449175451012636495931760775768244782094298865753527
9905936373267774215782242998025429793627422113

P = 98156973181620679211853421049873645267348559832027798575924056293
79966924732117737155869610686328434555787330656322711102820785964
943055892282853176094089

Q = 12589468470705273263461973192074899819962797457208232192214149362
39300384536095509869259165697215232635581094515425149166700032129
6926470121976969660208161

Public parameters

N = 12589468470705273263461973192074899819962797457208232192212357441
19049876613244964092850162325646911182385305926268690398208897117
16151616920802900114105503684028781673723882053400476571357110578
89783956542652583652351606989740176949881860656764127057886348459
91037231728862771180095319243465913667961181683881952241148605548
24660954136393556092086822258328661660329

E = 65537

RSA parameters

Real World



www.banking.com



Binding Mathematics to the real world

Mathematics

Private \longleftrightarrow Public

- **Public key:** (e, N)
- **Private key:** d

$$d \equiv e^{-1} \pmod{\Phi(N)}$$

Real World

Public \longleftrightarrow Entity Identifier

- **Public key:** (e, N)
- **Entity:** google.com

$$(e, N) \longleftrightarrow \text{google.com}$$



Binding Mathematics to the real world

This binding is obtained using a **digital certificate**.



Binding Mathematics to the real world

Private Key \longleftrightarrow Public Key \longleftrightarrow Entity Identifier
Maths Certs



Q: What is a certificate?



Q: What is a certificate? (1/3)

A: A certificate is a sequence of bytes that contains:



Q: What is a certificate? (1/3)

A: A certificate is a sequence of bytes that contains:

- A **public key**, depending on the cryptography scheme used (e.g. DH, RSA).



Q: What is a certificate? (1/3)

A: A **certificate** is a **sequence of bytes** that contains:

- A **public key**, depending on the cryptography scheme used (e.g. DH, RSA).
- Some information regarding the **entity associated with the public key**.



Q: What is a certificate? (2/3)

A: A certificate is a sequence of bytes that contains:



Q: What is a certificate? (2/3)

A: A certificate is a sequence of bytes that contains:

- A **signature** which assures the validity of the binding between the entity and the public key.



Q: What is a certificate? (2/3)

A: A certificate is a sequence of bytes that contains:

- A **signature** which assures the validity of the binding between the entity and the public key.
- Some information regarding the **entity that has signed the certificate.**



Q: What is a certificate? (2/3)

A: A certificate is a sequence of bytes that contains:

- A **signature** which assures the validity of the binding between the entity and the public key.
- Some information regarding the **entity that has signed the certificate.**
- Some information regarding the **way the certificate should be used**



Q: What is a certificate? (3/3)

Everytime you see a **certificate**, remember:

1. **Public key**
2. **Entity**
3. **CA Entity**
4. **CA Signature**
5. **Usage information**



Q: What is a certificate? (3/3)

Everytime you see a **certificate**, remember:

1. **Public key**
2. **Entity**
3. **CA Entity**
4. **CA Signature**
5. **Usage information**

CA \longrightarrow Certificate Authority



In **SSL/TLS** the certificate format used is the **X.509** standard in RFC 5280 by the **PKIX** group.

Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile

Status of This Memo

This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements. Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state and status of this protocol. Distribution of this memo is unlimited.

Abstract

This memo profiles the X.509 v3 certificate and X.509 v2 certificate revocation list (CRL) for use in the Internet. An overview of this approach and model is provided as an introduction. The X.509 v3 certificate format is described in detail, with additional information regarding the format and semantics of Internet name forms. Standard certificate extensions are described and two Internet-specific extensions are defined. A set of required certificate extensions is specified. The X.509 v2 CRL format is described in detail along with standard and Internet-specific extensions. An algorithm for X.509 certification path validation is described. An ASN.1 module and examples are provided in the appendices.

<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5280>



Some fields within the X.509 format

- **Version**
- **Serial Number**
- **Issuer**
- **Validity**
- **Subject**
- **Public Key**
- **Signature Algorithm**



Everytime we connect to an **HTTPs** server, we're also downloading a **chain of certificates**.



OpenSSL commands

Download TLS certificate given TLS endpoint

```
openssl s_client -connect leonardotamiano.xyz:443 -showcerts \  
    </dev/null 2>/dev/null \  
| openssl x509 -outform PEM > cert.pem
```



Several **formats** for saving **TLS certificates**:

- PEM (Privacy Enhanced Mail)
- CER
- DER
- PFX



Example of a PEM certificate

```
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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-----END CERTIFICATE-----
```



OpenSSL command to read PEM certificate (1/5)

```
openssl x509 -in leonardotamiano.xyz -noout -text
```



OpenSSL command to read PEM certificate (2/5)

Certificate:

Data:

Version: 3 (0x2)

Serial Number:

03:c9:4f:74:52:5e:84:22:a6:10:4c:6e:ee:65:aa:24:c0:28

Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption

Issuer: C = US, O = Let's Encrypt, CN = R3

Validity

Not Before: Nov 9 02:31:43 2022 GMT

Not After : Feb 7 02:31:42 2023 GMT

Subject: CN = leonardotamiano.xyz



OpenSSL command to read PEM certificate (3/5)

```
Subject Public Key Info:  
  Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption  
    RSA Public-Key: (2048 bit)  
    Modulus:  
      00:bf:66:f5:46:e3:96:3c:af:48:2b:f2:1b:80:a6:  
      c5:ec:c2:98:73:0b:05:f2:ca:79:46:33:bc:21:a5:  
      ee:fa:e6:7a:0c:78:f5:84:69:e2:d8:ab:97:ae:15:  
      b6:9d:40:a5:97:58:7b:cb:8a:39:70:0e:f0:29:8e:  
      13:9d:dc:51:7e:a6:37:4e:f3:66:97:49:1e:8f:51:  
      14:0c:f7:5b:13:76:b1:7a:c5:e2:a4:ad:fb:fa:0b:  
      64:19:49:61:62:88:4d:7b:a1:a9:be:3b:cd:c8:9c:  
      de:cd:5a:f5:ec:f8:73:6d:a0:8c:0a:2e:ed:d5:7f:  
      31:27:96:5d:00:76:d6:40:dc:cb:41:cd:c0:cb:0e:  
      da:c1:30:be:28:9e:62:0b:23:fd:26:15:0d:25:f6:  
      2c:11:70:30:9f:6d:dc:45:4a:2c:13:0f:af:20:37:  
      48:c5:ec:76:9d:79:0e:da:55:18:49:f1:6d:d9:b9:  
      cc:a5:6b:c2:97:19:e8:76:b0:c7:e3:e4:88:a1:22:  
      db:54:10:d6:2a:c3:90:24:15:7f:07:af:42:33:28:  
      de:25:76:6d:89:e5:c8:a0:16:a8:97:ae:22:69:2f:  
      54:cb:1a:a9:ac:9e:df:b7:3e:85:f9:82:98:1e:3d:  
      d2:55:e2:7c:7c:ef:73:65:4b:05:8a:3a:18:ed:aa:  
      46:e9  
    Exponent: 65537 (0x10001)
```



OpenSSL command to read PEM certificate (4/5)

```
X509v3 extensions:  
  X509v3 Key Usage: critical  
    Digital Signature, Key Encipherment  
  X509v3 Extended Key Usage:  
    TLS Web Server Authentication, TLS Web Client Authentication  
  X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical  
    CA:FALSE  
  X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:  
    95:D7:2A:40:E7:65:94:28:81:64:48:A1:CB:59:A3:AD:5E:54:5A:11  
  X509v3 Authority Key Identifier:  
    keyid:14:2E:B3:17:B7:58:56:CB:AE:50:09:40:E6:1F:AF:9D:8B:14:C2:C6
```



OpenSSL command to read PEM certificate (5/5)

```
...  
Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption  
0d:3c:b7:9b:19:0c:5d:d9:2f:d8:f2:62:bf:ca:0a:d4:45:6d:  
88:21:fc:68:1b:09:a1:5b:c6:cf:71:bd:6a:18:c0:ca:f1:81:  
37:ed:07:0c:4d:0c:34:c8:76:f0:6d:9e:62:ea:69:5b:d2:0f:  
12:48:6c:82:90:01:dd:17:34:5d:aa:76:e3:d4:cc:44:3e:c8:  
b6:b3:28:b6:09:43:15:30:b0:2f:91:fd:03:fb:f8:11:6c:b0:  
5d:96:85:81:9b:10:a2:8d:22:2b:83:3e:38:78:e7:e7:73:61:  
a2:34:96:05:27:02:d3:66:2c:df:95:9f:c1:44:7c:86:e8:ec:  
a8:54:c8:c1:74:cc:87:c1:47:13:b4:ab:8a:89:25:b4:43:1f:  
7c:78:98:19:48:9b:0b:22:05:44:15:1b:e7:99:3e:c9:a1:ab:  
24:b4:5c:1f:22:5d:88:ad:5c:b5:51:b6:9d:6d:15:c1:e6:02:  
dd:11:f9:1f:ad:fb:8f:b6:bf:40:e2:2c:67:e5:48:c2:29:c2:  
18:7d:3e:4f:51:b2:b4:df:34:82:5f:5a:26:bc:e7:f0:7f:8f:  
ae:8d:cb:61:9f:8f:f6:d9:4d:bc:c3:b1:22:b5:db:4c:62:56:  
d4:41:4f:58:f6:76:5c:70:ad:cf:4b:05:a7:90:d3:35:1a:a4:  
9c:06:2f:43
```



To deal with **SSL/TLS** we can use **pyOpenSSL**, a python wrapper around a subset of the famous OpenSSL library.

Welcome to pyOpenSSL's documentation!

Release v22.2.0.dev ([What's new?](#)).

pyOpenSSL is a rather thin wrapper around (a subset of) the OpenSSL library. With thin wrapper we mean that a lot of the object methods do nothing more than calling a corresponding function in the OpenSSL library.



Download certs data into JSON (1/4)

```
def establish_ssl_session(host, port=443):
    dst = (host.encode("utf-8"), port)
    s = socket.create_connection(dst)
    ctx = OpenSSL.SSL.Context(OpenSSL.SSL.SSLv23_METHOD)
    s = OpenSSL.SSL.Connection(ctx, s)
    s.set_connect_state()
    # -- sets the server-name-indication (sni) extension
    s.set_tlsext_host_name(dst[0])
    s.do_handshake()
    return s
```

(code/example_1_tls_certs.py)



Download certs data into JSON (2/4)

```
def get_tls_certs_chain(ssl_session):  
    result = {}  
    result["host"] = ssl_session.get_servername().decode("utf-8")  
    result["tlsVersion"] = ssl_session.get_protocol_version_name()  
    for (idx, cert) in enumerate(ssl_session.get_peer_cert_chain()):  
        result[str(idx)] = dump_cert_data(cert)  
    return result
```

(code/example_1_tls_certs.py)



Download certs data into JSON (3/4)

```
def dump_cert_data(x509):
    cert_data = {}
    cert_data["subject"] = x509.get_subject().commonName

    pubkey = x509.get_pubkey()
    pubkey_public_params = pubkey.to_cryptography_key().public_numbers()

    if pubkey.type() == OpenSSL.crypto.TYPE_EC:
        cert_data["pubkey"] = {
            "type": "Elliptic-Curve (EC)",
            "curve": pubkey_public_params.curve.name,
            "x": pubkey_public_params.x,
            "y": pubkey_public_params.y,
        }
    elif pubkey.type() == OpenSSL.crypto.TYPE_RSA:
        cert_data["pubkey"] = {
            "type": "RSA",
            "n": pubkey_public_params.n,
            "e": pubkey_public_params.e,
        }

    cert_data["issuer"] = x509.get_issuer().commonName

    return cert_data
```

(code/example_1_tls_certs.py)



Download certs data into JSON (4/4)

```
def main():
    if len(sys.argv) < 3:
        print(f"Usage: {sys.argv[0]} <host> <port>")
        exit()
    try:
        host = sys.argv[1]
        port = int(sys.argv[2])
    except ValueError as e:
        print(f"[ERR] - Failed to convert '{sys.argv[2]}' into an int")
        print(e)
        exit()

    ssl_session = establish_ssl_session(host, port)
    res = get_tls_certs_chain(ssl_session)
    print(json.dumps(res, indent=4))
```




THE PUBLIC KEY INFRASTRUCTURE



Certificates, by themselves, **are not enough.**



We need an entire **infrastructure** which allows us to manage those certificates.



https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public_key_infrastructure



PUBLIC-KEY INFRASTRUCTURE (PKI)

With **PKI** we mean the sets of **protocols, policies** and the **cryptographic mechanism** that drive the management of **public key certificates**.



The PKI in the context of the **SSL/TLS** protocol is used **authenticate** server and client.



To understand the PKI we need to review:

- **Trust**
- **Certificate Authorities (CAs)**
- **The Hierarchy of the PKI**
- **PKI in SSL/TLS**



TRUST IN THE PKI



A **certificate** binds a public key to an identity.

**But what is it that makes a
certificate valid?**



Q: What is it that makes a certificate valid?

A: The **signature** field of the certificate.



We can now talk about **trust**.



TRUST: tricky concept that carries significant emotional and rational meaning when discussed in general everyday life.



Trust in personal relationship



Trust in the PKI (1/5)

We have to put aside the common meaning of the word and only think about it in **narrower, more specific and technical terms.**



Trust in the PKI (2/5)

In the context of PKI, we trust a certificate only if we **acknowledge** the entity that has signed the certificate.



Trust in the PKI (3/5)

Q: How do we **acknowledge** the entity that has signed the certificate?



Trust in the PKI (3/5)

Q: How do we **acknowledge** the entity that has signed the certificate?

A: By using an internal database, generally called a **trust store**.



Trust in the PKI (4/5)

Certificates stored in the **trust store** are called

root certificates

We trust anything that has been signed using a **private key** related to a **public key** contained in a **root certificate**.



Trust in the PKI (5/5)

This **acknowledgement** can be done either directly or indirectly through a **chain of certificates**.



CERTIFICATE AUTHORITIES



Certificate Authorities, also known as **CAs** are entities that **store, sign and issue** digital certificates such as **X.509** certificates.



In the **trust store** we store the **root certificates** of **trusted CAs**.

The idea is to **trust anything** that is signed by a **trusted CA**.



The role of each **CA** is to issue certificates only to the correct entities.

This can be done by introducing another entity known as a **RA**

RA \longrightarrow **Registration Authority**



Certificate Signing Requests (1/2)

To generate a new certificate we have to issue a

CSR → Certificate
→ Signing
→ Requests



Certificate Signing Requests (2/2)

Process of generating a new certificate:



Certificate Signing Requests (2/2)

Process of generating a new certificate:

- Generation of personal private/public key pair.



Certificate Signing Requests (2/2)

Process of generating a new certificate:

- Generation of personal private/public key pair.
- Generation of CSR which contains our public key pair as well as the entity identifier to be put in the certificate.



Certificate Signing Requests (2/2)

Process of generating a new certificate:

- Generation of personal private/public key pair.
- Generation of CSR which contains our public key pair as well as the entity identifier to be put in the certificate.
- The CSR is sent to a CA.



Certificate Signing Requests (2/2)

Process of generating a new certificate:

- Generation of personal private/public key pair.
- Generation of CSR which contains our public key pair as well as the entity identifier to be put in the certificate.
- The CSR is sent to a CA.
- The CA, after having checked the authenticity of the entity, eventually by going through an **RA**, sends back the signed certificate.



Example of a CA: Let's Encrypt



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THE HIERARCHY OF THE PKI



As it has already been established, everytime we connect to an **HTTPs server**, we download a

chain of certificates



There are various types of certificates:

- Leaf certificates
- Intermediate CAs certificates
- Root CA certificates



We have that:

- **Leaf certificates** certified by **intermediate CAs certificates**.
- **Intermediate CAs certificates** certified by **root CA certificates**.
- **Root CA certificates** certify their own identity (!).




We have that:

- **Leaf certificates** certified by **intermediate CAs certificates**.
- **Intermediate CAs certificates** certified by **root CA certificates**.
- **Root CA certificates** certify their own identity (!).

Remember: We trust a root CA certificate only if it is physically saved in the **trust store**.



Example of a 2 level chain



Certificate Chains

List of certificates followed by one or more CA certificates, with the following properties:

- The issuer of each certificate (except the last one) matches the subject of the next certificate in the list.
- Each certificate (except the last one) is supposed to be signed by the secret key corresponding to the next certificate in the chain.
- The last certificate in the list is a trust anchor: a certificate that you trust because it was delivered to you by some trustworthy procedure.



PKI IN SSL/TLS




In **SSL/TLS** certificates are used during the TLS handshake to perform

- **server authentication**
- **client authentication**



Server authentication (\leq TLSv1.2)



HANDS-ON 1: HTTPS WEB SERVER



Let us now understand how to setup a web server and add support for **HTTPs**.



In particular we will use the following software stack:

- **ubuntu 20.04**
- **nginx**
- **openssl**

For those interested at the end a **docker image** will be made available to play and tinker with.



Starting point

```
user@47b491e10890:~$ lsb_release -a
No LSB modules are available.
Distributor ID: Ubuntu
Description:    Ubuntu 20.04.5 LTS
Release:        20.04
Codename:       focal
user@47b491e10890:~$ uname -a
Linux 47b491e10890 5.15.65-1-lts #1 SMP Mon,
 05 Sep 2022 15:40:39 +0000 x86_64 x86_64 x86_64 GNU/Linux
```



Become root

```
user@47b491e10890:~$ su  
Password:  
root@47b491e10890:/home/user#
```



Install **nginx** and **openssl**

```
apt-get install -y nginx openssl
```



Use **OpenSSL** to generate RSA 2048 bit key as well as a **self-signed certificate**

```
openssl req -x509 -nodes -days 365 \  
    -newkey rsa:2048 \  
    -keyout nginx-selfsigned.key \  
    -out nginx-selfsigned.crt
```



During certificate generation the most important field is the **Common Name** field.

```
Country Name (2 letter code) [AU]:  
State or Province Name (full name) [Some-State]:  
Locality Name (eg, city) []:  
Organization Name (eg, company) [Internet Widgits Pty Ltd]:  
Organizational Unit Name (eg, section) []:  
Common Name (e.g. server FQDN or YOUR name) []:localhost  
Email Address []:
```



The **Common Name** field has to be equal to the **Domain Name** of the server that is translated using the **DNS** protocol.

`www.google.com`



Move files into `/etc/ssl/private/` folder.

```
mv /home/user/nginx-selfsigned.key /etc/ssl/private/nginx-selfsigned.key  
mv /home/user/nginx-selfsigned.crt /etc/ssl/certs/nginx-selfsigned.crt
```



Generate 2048 bit **Diffie-Hellman** parameters

```
openssl dhparam -out /etc/ssl/certs/dhparam.pem 2048
```



```
-----BEGIN DH PARAMETERS-----  
MIIBCakCAQEAwJbkDLiwMysR9epWPxz8nsuGYcidRyfxj5f1dtKtEr3hs6+1niKp  
057Qhky3r1wMBVxdJXtvTFf0U4IpFIxSD6E4o4m/Xb8VdyfMz8JEdwB1CPD+rmb8  
FFPge10dqGvVs80QfUWSXwa1Lq5u7+319ZP1K32Q9awdW4gvI4iWMKQA+8zkEtrF  
TsM4oZXcFsEH1yATLLnqubyYR3PwiB7mvyneEnEFwsSdAcy0oBIopiuKRWaqRxTG  
v5XZaj10VIb4GiUouKYiSuYhtbeb+aF8Tyds0vsTu5fMuWt51UQ0orXgp4Q0DzGg  
1W/jXzBoSLneBqoX00Pq+qnvjKigptHGwwIBAg==  
-----END DH PARAMETERS-----
```

(/etc/ssl/certs/dhparam.pem)



Create config file for OpenSSL integration

```
ssl_protocols TLSv1.2;
ssl_prefer_server_ciphers on;
ssl_dhparam /etc/ssl/certs/dhparam.pem;
ssl_ciphers ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA512:DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA512:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA
ssl_ecdh_curve secp384r1; # Requires nginx >= 1.1.0
ssl_session_timeout 10m;
ssl_session_cache shared:SSL:10m;
ssl_session_tickets off; # Requires nginx >= 1.5.9
resolver 8.8.8.8 8.8.4.4 valid=300s;
resolver_timeout 5s;
add_header X-Frame-Options DENY;
add_header X-Content-Type-Options nosniff;
add_header X-XSS-Protection "1; mode=block";
```

(/etc/nginx/snippets/ssl-params.conf)



Edit nginx virtual host configuration file

```
server {  
    listen 80 ssl;  
    listen [::]:80 ssl;  
  
    ssl_certificate /etc/ssl/certs/nginx-selfsigned.crt;  
    ssl_certificate_key /etc/ssl/private/nginx-selfsigned.key;  
    include snippets/ssl-params.conf;  
  
    root /var/www/html;  
    index index.html index.htm index.nginx-debian.html;  
    server_name _;  
    location / {  
        try_files $uri $uri/ =404;  
    }  
}
```

(/etc/nginx/sites-available/default)



Restart service

```
service nginx restart
```



Now we can connect to our new HTTPs server.



La connessione non è privata

Gli utenti malintenzionati potrebbero provare a carpire le tue informazioni da **localhost** (ad esempio, password, messaggi o carte di credito). [Ulteriori informazioni](#)

NET::ERR_CERT_AUTHORITY_INVALID

💡 Per il massimo livello di sicurezza di Chrome, [attiva la protezione avanzata](#)

Avanzate

Torna nell'area protetta



View TLS handshake with curl

```
$ curl -v -k https://localhost:1337
  Trying 127.0.0.1:1337...
  Connected to localhost (127.0.0.1) port 1337 (#0)
  ALPN: offers h2
  ALPN: offers http/1.1
  TLSv1.3 (OUT), TLS handshake, Client hello (1):
  TLSv1.3 (IN), TLS handshake, Server hello (2):
  TLSv1.2 (IN), TLS handshake, Certificate (11):
  TLSv1.2 (IN), TLS handshake, Server key exchange (12):
  TLSv1.2 (IN), TLS handshake, Server finished (14):
  TLSv1.2 (OUT), TLS handshake, Client key exchange (16):
  TLSv1.2 (OUT), TLS change cipher, Change cipher spec (1):
  TLSv1.2 (OUT), TLS handshake, Finished (20):
  TLSv1.2 (IN), TLS handshake, Finished (20):
  SSL connection using TLSv1.2 / ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384
  ALPN: server accepted http/1.1
  Server certificate:
    subject: C=AU; ST=Some-State; O=Internet Widgits Pty Ltd
    start date: Dec  2 19:41:12 2022 GMT
    expire date: Dec  2 19:41:12 2023 GMT
    issuer: C=AU; ST=Some-State; O=Internet Widgits Pty Ltd
  SSL certificate verify result: self signed certificate (18), continuing anyway.
```



The following Dockerfile may be useful

```
# syntax=docker/dockerfile:1
FROM ubuntu:20.04

RUN mkdir /var/run/sshd
RUN chmod 0755 /var/run/sshd

RUN apt-get update
RUN apt-get upgrade -y
RUN apt-get install -y nginx openssl curl nano ssh passwd

RUN useradd --create-home --shell /bin/bash user
RUN echo 'user:password' | chpasswd
RUN echo 'root:password' | chpasswd

EXPOSE 22
EXPOSE 80

WORKDIR /home/user

CMD ["/usr/sbin/sshd", "-D"]
```

(code/example_2_nginx_with_https/Dockerfile)



Build docker image

```
docker image build -t cns_nginx_with_https .
```

Run docker

```
docker run -p 1337:80 -p 1338:22 cns_nginx_with_https
```



HANDS-ON 2: TLS EXPORTERS



RFC 5246 defines a mechanism for exporting **keying material** from TLS to an application or protocol residing at an upper layer.

This material can then be used for generating secure data between clients and servers.



Request for Comments: 5705

<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5705>

Keying Material Exporters for Transport Layer Security (TLS)

Abstract

A number of protocols wish to leverage Transport Layer Security (TLS) to perform key establishment but then use some of the keying material for their own purposes. This document describes a general mechanism for allowing that.



The **TLS exporter** works within a TLS session and takes three input parameters:

- A label string
- A length value
- A context (optional)



Value computed by **TLS exporter** without context

$$\text{PRF}(\text{master_secret}, \\ \text{label}, \\ \text{client_random} + \text{server_random})[\text{length}]$$


Value computed by **TLS exporter** with context

$\text{PRF}(\text{master_secret},$
 $\text{label},$
 $\text{client_random} + \text{server_random},$
 $\text{context_length} + \text{context_value})[\text{length}]$



Where **PRF** is the **TLS Pseudorandom Function** in use for the current session.

The output is a pseudorandom bit string of length bytes generated from the **master_secret** of the session.



We can test out this functionality with `pyOpenSSL` using the `export_keying_material` method.

```
export_keying_material(label, olen, context=None)
```

Obtain keying material for application use.

Param: label - a disambiguating label string as described in RFC 5705

Param: olen - the length of the exported key material in bytes

Param: context - a per-association context value

Returns: the exported key material bytes or None



Exported Keying Material with pyOpenSSL (1/3)

```
def establish_ssl_session(host, port=443):
    dst = (host.encode("utf-8"), port)
    s = socket.create_connection(dst)
    ctx = OpenSSL.SSL.Context(OpenSSL.SSL.SSLv23_METHOD)
    s = OpenSSL.SSL.Connection(ctx, s)
    s.set_connect_state()
    # -- sets the server-name-indication (sni) extension
    s.set_tlsext_host_name(dst[0])
    s.do_handshake()
    return s
```

(code/example_3_export_keying_material.py)



Exported Keying Material with pyOpenSSL (2/3)

```
def get_keying_material(ssl_session, length, label=b"EXPORTER_EXPERIMENTAL", context=None):  
    returned_bytes = ssl_session.export_keying_material(label, length, context)  
    return returned_bytes
```



Exported Keying Material with pyOpenSSL (3/3)

```
def main():
    if len(sys.argv) < 4:
        print(f"Usage: {sys.argv[0]} <host> <port> <length>")
        exit()
    try:
        host = sys.argv[1]
        port = int(sys.argv[2])
        length = int(sys.argv[3])
    except ValueError as e:
        print(f"[ERR] - Failed to convert argument into an int")
        print(e)
        exit()

    ssl_session = establish_ssl_session(host, port)
    keying_material = get_keying_material(ssl_session, length)
    if not keying_material:
        print("[ERR] - Failed to export keying material")
        exit()
    print(f"From TLS connection to ({host}, {port}) computed following keying material:")
    print(f"  Bytes: {keying_material}")
    print(f"  Hex: {keying_material.hex()}")
```

(code/example_3_export_keying_material.py)

